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Abstract. Named Data Networking (NDN) is an instance of information-
centric network architecture designed as a candidate replacement for the
current IP-based Internet. It emphasizes ecient content distribution,
achieved via in-network caching and collapsing of closely-spaced content
requests. NDN also oers strong security and explicitly decouples con-
tent from entities that distribute it. NDN is widely assumed to provide
better privacy than IP, mainly because NDN packets lack source and
destination addresses. In this paper, we show that this assumption does
not hold in practice. In particular, we present several algorithms that
help locate consumers by taking advantage of NDN router-side content
caching. We use simulations to evaluate these algorithms on a large and
realistic topology, and validate the results on the ocial NDN testbed.
Beyond locating consumers, proposed techniques can also be used to
detect eavesdroppers.
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1 Introduction
Despite its impressive longevity, popularity and overall success, the Internet is
starting to suer from limitations of its original early 1980-s design. Current pro-
tocols (in particular, IP) were conceived when remote login, email and resource
sharing were the most prominent Internet use-cases. However, a signicant frac-
tion of today's Internet trac corresponds to content distribution. Recognizing
this paradigm shift in the nature of Internet trac, multiple large-scale research
eorts [5], [19,20], [22], [32] have been trying { in the last 5-6 years { to address
the shortcomings of the current Internet, with the long-term goal of replacing
it with a next-generation Internet architecture. One such eort is Named Data
Networking (NDN) [15].
NDN is an example of Content-Centric Networking (CCN), where content {
rather than a host or an interface { plays the central role in the architecture. NDN
is primarily oriented towards ecient large-scale data distribution. Rather than
contacting a host at some IP address in order to request data, an NDN consumer
directly requests desired content by name by issuing an interest packet. The
network takes care of nding and returning the nearest copy of requested content
that \satises" the consumer's interest. To this end, NDN features ubiquitous
content caching, i.e., any host or router can store a copy of the content it receives
or forwards, and use it to satisfy subsequent interests. NDN also provides interest
collapsing, i.e., only the rst of multiple closely spaced interests for the same
content is forwarded by each router. Unlike IP datagrams, NDN interests and
content packets do not carry source or destination addresses. One of the alleged
consequences of this feature is consumer location privacy. In this paper we show
that two fundamental NDN features (ubiquitous caching and interest collapsing)
can be used to violate consumer location privacy. Specically, we show how
information leaked by caching and interest collapsing can be used to identify
and locate consumers.
Assuming that the adversary can associate NDN routers with their physical
location using existing methods, we focus on designing techniques that identify
the router closest to the targeted consumer. We then show that proposed tech-
niques can be used to determine consumers' location, as well as detect \eaves-
droppers" that are surreptitiously requesting content for a particular set of users,
e.g., in audio/video conferencing applications [14], [33]. We validate our results
via experiments on the ocial NDN testbed [21]. Finally, we propose some coun-
termeasure that mitigate these attacks.
We believe that this topic is both timely and important, since one of the
key design goals of NDN is security by design. This is in contrast with today's
Internet where security and privacy problems were (and are still being) identied
and patched along the way. Therefore, assessing if and how geo-location and
eavesdroppers identication can be implemented must be done before NDN is
fully deployed. Furthermore, even though the research community has made
signicant eorts in geo-locating hosts in the current Internet [9], [13], [16,17],
[23,24], [29,30,31], none of these techniques apply to locating consumers in NDN.
(See Section 3.) In fact, to the best of our knowledge, all prior techniques rely
on the ability to directly address the victim host. This is not possible in NDN
since consumers cannot be contacted directly.
Organization: We start by overviewing the NDN architecture in Section 2.
Related work is discussed in Section 3. Section 4 introduces our system and
adversary models. Proposed techniques are presented in Section 5 and evaluated
in Section 6. Detection of eavesdroppers is addressed in Section 7. Finally, geo-
location countermeasures are presented in Section 8. We conclude in Section 9.
2 NDN Overview
NDN supports two types of packets: interest and content [4]. Notable elds in
content packets are: (1) content name, (2) payload, and (3) digital signature
computed by the producer. Names are intended to be human-readable, consisting
of one or more components with a hierarchical structure. In NDN notation, \/"
separates name components, e.g., /ndn/cnn/politics.
Consumers request desired content by name, via interests. NDN routers for-
ward interests towards the content producer responsible for the requested name,
using longest name-prex matching for routing. If the requested content is not
encountered in caches of any intervening routers, the interest eventually arrives
to the producer. Upon receipt of the interest, the producer injects the content
into the network, thus satisfying the interest. The requested content packet is
then forwarded towards the consumer, traversing { in reverse { the path of the
preceding interest.
Each NDN router maintains three data structures: (1) Pending Interest Ta-
ble (PIT) storing interests that are not yet satised, (2) Forwarding Interest
Base (FIB) containing routing information, and (3) Content Store (CS) where
forwarded content is cached. When an NDN router receives an interest, it rst
looks up its PIT to check whether another interest for the same name is currently
pending. There are two possible outcomes:
1. The PIT look-up succeeds, i.e., PIT entry for the same name exists and:
{ The incoming interface of the present interest is new, the router updates
the PIT entry by adding the new interface to arrival-interfaces set. The
interest is not forwarded further. This feature is called interest collapsing.
{ The present interest's incoming interface is already in the set of that entry's
arrival-interfaces. In this case, the interest is simply discarded.
2. The PIT look-up fails. The router performs local cache look for the content
name referenced in the interest, and:
{ The cache look-up succeeds. The content is returned on the arriving inter-
face of the interest and no further actions are taken.
{ Otherwise, the router creates a new PIT entry and forwards the present
interest out on one or more interfaces, according to its FIB.
However, note that caching of content in routers is not mandatory. Although
each NDN router is expected to cache content, it is not required to do so. A
router can choose whether to cache a given content based on local criteria, such
as: size and occupancy rate of its cache, content name, as well as consumer or
producer wishes, i.e., the interest might request caching or no caching, or the
content itself might convey caching preferences.
3 Related Work
The goal of current geo-location techniques is to associate a physical location
with a particular IP address. There are many studies that investigate geo-location
in today's Internet [9], [13], [16,17], [23,24], [30,31].
Prior work can be divided in two classes: measurement-based and database-
driven techniques. The former involve a set of geographically distributed land-
mark hosts with known locations. Their purpose is to determine the position of
the target IP address using round-trip time (RTT) information as the basis for
triangulation. An algorithm estimates the location of the target IP using his-
torical data constructed using ground truth [13]. Multiple techniques can then
be used to improve accuracy. For example, Wong et al. [30,31] combine delay
measurements with locations of cities. [31] uses Bezier curves to represent a re-
gion containing the target IP, while [30] leverage a three-tier approach, where
every tier renes results of the previous one. Finally, Eriksson et al. [9] propose a
learning-based approach, where population density is used to construct a Nave
Bayes estimator.
All these techniques assume that, packets sent to a particular IP address
and echoed back (e.g., via ping) are guaranteed to come from the same physi-
cal host. Therefore, multiple RTT measurements correspond to the same target.
In contrast, requesting multiple NDN content packets created by the same pro-
ducer does not guarantee that requested content will be found at the same place.
Because of in-network caching, dierent content packets might be served by dis-
tinct entities. Thus, RTT measurements obtained by the landmarks can refer to
dierent nodes, and cannot be immediately used to locate a single target.
Database-driven approaches determine the target IP's location using DNS
LOC records, WhoIs lookups, Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) router tables,
and/or other public databases (e.g., ARIN [3], RIPE [25], GeoTrace [12] and
MaxMind GeoIP [11]). These resources either provide direct geographic infor-
mation, as in DNS LOC, or reveal indirect clues, such as the organization or
Autonomous System (AS) number that owns a particular IP address. For exam-
ple, techniques like GTrace [24], GeoTrack and GeoCluster [23] use these public
resources to locate the target IP, and then further rene the ndings using RTT
measurements. Recent work by Liu et al. [17] utilizes location data that users
willingly disclose via location-sharing services. This technique can locate a host
with a median estimation error of 799 meters { an order of magnitude better
than other approaches.
Because NDN consumers have no network-layer addresses, current geo-loca-
tion techniques are not directly applicable. However, it is possible to use current
techniques to locate content producers. Although there are no addresses that
can identify hosts in NDN, name-spaces can serve the same purpose. In fact, all
producers publishing within specic namespaces (e.g., /cnn/, or /microsoft/)
might be naturally located within the same Autonomous System (AS). Name
prexes could thus reveal location information. Similarly, routing tables can
reveal location information for name-spaces. Although, at this stage, there are no
location databases for NDN, it is not hard to anticipate these resources becoming
available if and when NDN becomes wider deployed.
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Fig. 1. Scenario considered throughout the paper.
4 System and Adversary Model
In the rest of the paper we consider the scenario illustrated in Figure 1. A con-
sumer (C) retrieves content, composed of multiple packets, from a producer (P ).
We focus on the case where C requests non-popular content, i.e., content that
is unlikely to have been recently requested by others. Thus, it is not cached in
relevant routers. Each interest traverses multiple routers before being satised
by P . The adversary (Adv) controls a set of hosts (hereafter called landmarks),
connected to NDN routers. These hosts controlled by Adv have no special privi-
leges and cannot eavesdrop on links between routers. We denote router i as Ri
and landmark j as Lj . Adv's goal is to determine C's location in the network,
i.e., identify the router closest to C.
4.1 System Model
We represent network topology as a undirected graph G = hV;Ei, where V is the
set of vertices (routers) and E is the set of edges (links between routers). Our
experiments on the ocial NDN testbed (see Section 6) show that NDN links
are largely symmetric, i.e., bandwidth and delay are the same in either direction.
For this reason, our system model also considers all links to be symmetric.
We performed experiments on the AT&T topology from Rocketfuel [26], de-
picted in Figure 2. It contains 625 vertexes and 2101 edges. In the experiments
we assume that every router caches content packets, which is the default NDN
setting. However, because NDN does not mandate a specic caching policy, we
also discuss how to apply geolocation techniques when some (or all) routers do
not cache content packets (see Section 5).
4.2 Adversary Model
We assume that C requests { and Adv can exploit { a large number of data
packets, possibly corresponding to a single piece of content, e.g., a high-resolution
video. We consider two distinct classes of adversaries: outsiders and insiders.
The former cannot directly (passively) monitor packets exchanged between P
and C. We assume that an outsider knows what type of applications C and P
are using. Therefore it might infer the structure and naming of content packets.
Fig. 2. AT&T topology.
However, if unique/secret naming is negotiated between P and C, outsiders
cannot guess content names. Insiders can observe packets exchanged by P and
C. For example, an insider could be a compromised WiFi access point to which
C is directly connected, or a malicious P . Thus, countermeasures such as content
name randomization are not eective.
Our analysis makes the following assumptions:
1. Topology Information: Adv knows the topology and geographic distri-
bution of routers. Today, some AS-s already publish this information [26].
Moreover, it has been shown that it is possible to reconstruct topology even
if this information is not publicly available [7].
2. Routing Information: Adv is aware of how interests are routed. Given the
sheer number of routers and AS-s involved in today's Internet routing, it is
unlikely that routing information can be kept secret.
3. Distance from Sources: Adv can determine the distance of a content
packet (expressed in terms of number of hops) from its closest source (e.g., a
cache) using Content Fetch Time (CFT) information, i.e., the time between
sending an interest and receiving the related content. Our experiments on
the ocial NDN testbed [21], reported in Section 6, conrm that this is
indeed currently possible.
4. Naming Information: Adv can predict the name of content packets re-
quested by C. As mentioned earlier, insiders and outsiders have dierent
capabilities.
5. Arbitrary Landmark Location: Adv can connect landmarks to arbitrary
routers in the network. For example, it can use a geographically distributed
botnet, or purchase resources from (multiple) cloud services with machines
located in dierent parts of the world. We allow Adv to select landmarks
adaptively (i.e., the next landmark is selected after gathering information
from all current landmarks) or non-adaptively, meaning that all landmarks
are chosen at once.
6. Upper-bound on Landmarks: Adv can compromise (or purchase) up
to a xed subset of nodes in a given topology, in order to turn them into
landmarks.
We refer to Adv with all aforementioned capabilities as routing-aware. As an
extension, we later consider a variant Adv that has no knowledge of routing
information. We call it non-routing-aware Adv.
5 Locating Consumers in NDN
To locate C, Adv requests cached content previously requested by C from multi-
ple landmarks Li. Each landmark measures CFT for each content. Since content
is cached (and therefore served) by some router on the return path between C to
P (P!C from here on), landmarks might learn some information about P!C.
Hence, Adv can use this information to infer the location of C.
If no intervening router caches content, Adv can use NDN interest collapsing
feature to locate C. For the sake of simplicity, and without loss of generality, we
describe Adv's steps to locate a specic Ri.
Recall that, as an interest traverses routers on the path from C to P , it
creates state in the form of a PIT entry. After receiving the interest, P injects
requested content into the network. As the content travels back towards C, each
router that forwards it ushes the corresponding PIT entry for that content.
However, if an interest from a landmark reaches Ri before the corresponding
PIT entry is ushed, (i.e., before the content packet requested by C arrives),
the CFT measured by the landmark will be lower than the CFT for content
fetched from P . This is due to interest collapsing: the landmark's interest is not
forwarded by Ri since an entry for previously pending interest (for the same
content) already exists in Ri's PIT. As shown in [2], this CFT dierence can
be easily identied by the landmark. In practice, dierent routers will adhere to
dierent caching strategies. Thus, while some routers might cache all packets,
others will not. Therefore, each landmark might have to probe either PIT-s, or
CS-s, or both.
Regardless of caching, Adv can only retrieve content previously requested
by C from routers, and not from C itself. Adv's interests are routed toward P ,
and can reach C only if C is on a path Adv!P . However, because C is a host
and not a router, it is never part of Adv!P . For this reason, we dene Adv's
goal as identifying C's rst-hop router. This allows Adv to accurately pinpoint
the C's location, e.g., possibly within a few blocks in a densely populated city.
Moreover, compared to expected errors in current geo-location techniques (on
the order of 10km using state-of-the-art [17]), identifying an edge router instead
of an end-host introduces only negligible errors. For this reason, in the rest of
the paper, we use C to indicate the edge router closest to the actual consumer.
Routing-Aware Adversary. Knowledge of network topology and all routing
tables allows landmarks to identify the source of content packets via CFT mea-
surements. This information reveals how far the content travels in the network
to reach the landmark. Given this distance, as well as topology and routing
information, Adv can determine which router served the content. Listing 1.1 de-
scribes the steps Adv performs to identify C. For each Li, Adv calculates path
Li!P and measures the number of hops (i.e., hopsLi) between Li and the cache
serving the content (see lines 6-10, Listing 1.1). Then, Adv identies the router
at position hopsLi in the path Li!P as a router on P!C. NC represents the
set of candidate nodes for C (lines 11-15).
Intuitively, location of landmarks with respect to routers on P!C path af-
fects the precision of locating C. In non-adaptive selection, Adv randomly selects
all landmarks at once. In the adaptive case, landmark selection is performed as
follows. Let Rg be a router identied by Adv as part of the path P!C. To nd
the next router on the path, Adv selects a Li that is far away from P , such
that the path from Li to P contains Rg (i.e., Li!P = Li!Rg!P ). Thus, if Li
retrieves content cached by router Ri 6= Rg, then Ri must (1) be on P!C, and
(2) be n  1 hops closer to C compared to Rg. The larger n, the fewer landmarks
are required to identify C. This process is repeated until no new landmarks are
able to discover routers closer to C, or if Adv reached its maximum number of
landmarks.
Listing 1.1. GuessPath - Routing Aware Adversary.
1 Input: G; P ; landmarks L; gateway routers; edge routers
2 Output: NPath (nodes believed to be part of the path P!C);
3 NC (nodes believed to include C)
4 NPath  P
5 NC  ;
6 for each available landmark Li f
7 pathLi  calculate path Li!P , ordered from Li to P
8 hopsLi  number of hops measured when retrieving from Li
9 NPath  NPath[ felement at position hopsLi in pathLig
10 g
11 for each n, s.t. n in NPath, and n is a gateway router f
12 for each n, s.t. n is an edge router, and n is connected to n f
13 NC  n
14 g
15 g
Non-Routing-Aware Adversary. The non-routing-aware adversary has no
knowledge of the content of routing tables. Without this knowledge, measuring
distances between the caches satisfying the landmarks' interests and the land-
marks does not provide as much information as in the case of routing-aware
adversaries. In fact, given a distance, Adv can identify a set of caching routers
that contains the one serving her requests, instead of a single router. In this case
the Adv's strategy includes three phases: Phase 1 : collecting information from
landmarks to assign a score to each node, Phase 2 : using scores to determine
routers that are likely in the path; and Phase 3: further rening the selection.
Pseudocode for the three phases is reported in Listing 1.2.
Listing 1.2. GuessPath - Non-Routing Aware Adversary.
1
2 Input: G; P ; landmarks L; threshold; numberOfComp;
3 gateway routers; edge routers
4 Output: NPath (nodes believed to be part of the path
5 P!C); NC (nodes believed to include C)
6 NPath  P , NC  ;
7 for each landmark Li f
8 Ri  router at one hop from Li
9 g
10 PHASE 1
11 for i = 1 to size(L) f
12 hopsLi  number of hops measured when retrieving from Li
13 hopsRi  hopsLi   1
14 suspectNodesLi  all nodes nLi at distance hopsLi from Li
15 suspectPathsLi  all possible paths to reach nodes
16 suspectNodesLi from Li
17 for each landmark Lj 6= Li f
18 if 9 spath in suspectPathsLi , s.t. Rj is in spath f
19 hopsLj  number of hops measured when
20 retrieving from Lj
21 if ((hopsRj ) 6= hopsLi   (position of Rj in spath))f
22 remove spath from suspectPathsLi
23 g
24 g
25 g
26 for each spath in suspectPathsLi f
27 n = node at position hopsLi in spath
28 Scoren = Scoren + 1=(hopsLi)
2
29 g
30 g
31 PHASE 2
32 for each n in V f
33 if (Scoren > threshold) f
34 N 0Path  n
35 g
36 g
37 PHASE 3
38 NPath  getConnComp(N 0Path; numberOfComp)
39 for each n in NPath and n is a gateway router f
40 for each n is an edge router and n connected to n f
41 NC  n
42 g
43 g
Phase 1 is based on two observations. First, estimation done independently
by each landmark Li (i.e., suspect nodes computed in line 13 in Listing 1.2) could
be partially incorrect. Because Li does not have access to routing information, it
might include routers that are not on P!C. However, estimates from dierent
landmarks can be checked against each other for consistency: nodes that are
not consistently considered as potential routers in the path from C to P will
be assigned a zero score. This consistency check (lines 16-24 in Listing 1.2) is
motivated as follows. Because each landmark Li is connected to just one router
Ri, learning the number of hops from Li to the source also implies learning
the distance from Ri to the source of the content. Moreover, because routing
information is not available to Adv, every path from Li to a \suspect" node is a
candidate (suspect) path. Let us consider the situation in Figure 3(b) where Rj ,
one hop away from Lj , belongs to a suspect path for Li. In this case, distance
measured by Li and Lj for Rj must be the same. If two distances dier, the
suspect path for Li is considered incorrect and no score is added to the suspect
node, as shown in Figure 3(c).
Suspect node 
for Li 
Actual source for 
the content for 
both Li and Lj 
First suspect 
path for Li 
Second suspect 
path for Li 
(a) Legend for gures 3(b) and 3(c)
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Fig. 3. Non-routing aware { Phase 1.
The second observation is used to add a score to the nodes selected as possible
candidates to be on the P!C path (denoted hereafter by NPath). In this case,
the closer Li is to NPath, the more specic is the information provided by Li.
For example, if we connect Li to a node in this path, Li could identify the source
without error { the content will be retrieved in zero hops, i.e., from the same
router to which Li is connected. Instead, if we connect Li at a certain distance
(denoted as hopsLi) from a node on NPath, Li will consider any node that is
hopsLi -hops away from itself as a possible node in NPath. As a consequence, the
greater hopsLi , the higher is the number of candidate nodes; thus, errors are more
likely. In Listing 1.2, this observation is reected in line 27 where 1=(hopsLi)
2
is used to assign a score to the nodes. The intuition behind this assignment has
a geometric explanation. Considering the selected node Li as the center of a
sphere and the distance hopsLi as the radius, the area of the sphere is a good
estimator of the number of candidate nodes.
Phase 2 uses the scores provided in Phase 1 to select a number of nodes
as sources of content packets. In this case, we select the nodes that exceed a
predened threshold as possible sources.
Phase 3 further renes node selection. We use the set of selected nodes from
Phase 2 to create a subgraph of G. Then, we compute connected components in
this new graph and we order them from the closest to the farthest from the pro-
ducer. We consider the distance from a component ConnComp[i] to the producer
as the distance, computed in graph G, from the closest node of ConnComp[i]
to the producer. Therefore, Adv assumes that the nodes from ConnComp[0] to
ConnComp[k   1] are in the path P!C. Finally, we consider all edge nodes
connected to gateway nodes in NPath as the nodes that include C.
Landmarks are selected to minimize the dierence between: (i) the score
assigned to the new landmark by the previous selection step, and (ii) the average
score.
6 Evaluation
In the current Internet, the relationship between RTT and distance measured in
hops is subject to variation of the triangle inequality. Such variations make RTT-
based distance estimation unreliable [18]. We studied this phenomenon on the
NDN tested, and we evaluate how it aects the attacks discussed in this paper.
To this end, we used Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) [8] virtual machine
instances. Each EC2 instance was connected to the testbed at a dierent router,
and was used to either publish or request content. We performed exhaustive
tests, including producer/consumer combinations. Figure 4(b) summarizes our
ndings. It also shows approximate physical straight-line distance between NDN
nodes. Reported CFT is obtained after subtracting the CFT between the EC2
instance acting as C and the rst-hop router. Our experiments conrm that: (1)
links between routers are symmetric in terms of bandwidth and delay, except
as discussed below; (2) triangle inequality violations only add a small amount
of noise to distance estimation. CFT is symmetric for every link except for UA-
REMAP, PKU-UCLA and PKU-NEU. In the rst case, asymmetry is due to
the paths UA!REMAP vs REMAP!CSU!UA. We consider asymmetry in
PKU-NEU and PKU-UCLA links to be an artifact of the current NDN testbed,
since it is deployed as an IP overlay, and not a property of NDN.
We ran multiple experiments in which we connected P and C to dierent
nodes. For every experiment we measure CFT connecting landmarks to all nodes
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Fig. 4. The NDN Testbed.
in the testbed. Our measurements reveal that 8% of landmarks provided an
incorrect distance, likely due to violation of triangle inequality. Therefore, actual
distance measurements on the testbed would be aected by \random noise" with
probability 8%.
6.1 Performance of Our Algorithms
To evaluate the eectiveness of our strategies, we dened three metrics, which can
be informally summarized as: (a) how eective are our strategies in identifying
nodes in the path? (b) Of the selected nodes, how far from C is the closest?
(c) How often do our strategies correctly identify C? Although (c) is arguably
the most \natural" metric, it is also the one that provides the least amount
of information, representing a simple binary outcome (identied/not identied).
Therefore, we believe that (a) and (b) complement this metric by providing
further details on how close Adv is to identifying C.
We express (a) as two quantities: true positive (i.e., nodes that have been
correctly identied) and false positives (nodes that have been erroneously agged
as part of the path):
True positive=
# of output nodes in the path
# of total nodes in the path
False positive=
# of output nodes not in the path
# of total nodes not in the path
We compared our strategy with random guessing. This represents the best adver-
sarial strategy if NDN truly provides consumer anonymity, i.e., if the adversary
can gather no information at all about consumers. We model random guessing
using the urn model without replacement [10] where the number of draws q is
the number of nodes identied by our strategy in the same setting. Let N be
the number of nodes in the topology, and m the length of the path P!C. The
probability of choosing j nodes from the path is:
P(j) =
 
m
j
 
N m
q j
 
N
q
 (1)
We calculate true pos for our random strategy as the expected number of nodes
chosen from the path, divided by the number of nodes:
true pos =
Pmin(m;q)
j=1 j  P(j)

m
(2)
Analogously, false positive are calculated as the expected number of incorrectly
selected nodes (q   j) divided by the number of nodes:
f alse pos =
Pmin(m;q)
j=0 (q   j)  P(j)

(N  m) (3)
With respect to (b), we select as baseline the average distance to the consumer
in the network. In particular, we calculate the average of the distance from every
node in the network to the consumer as:
avg =
PN
i=0 d (i)

N
(4)
where d(i) is the distance of node i from the consumer.
We report results for paths of length 6. This length was selected since it is
the most likely distance in several topologies (see Figure 5.)
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Fig. 5. Probability distribution of path lengths in the AT&T (see Figure 2) and Ve-
rio [26] topologies.
Routing-Aware Adversary { Non-Adaptive Landmarks Selection. Re-
sults in this conguration for AT&T are reported in gure 6(a). Our technique is
able to keep false positive very low due to the availability of routing information.
It is interesting to note that the algorithm is not always able to guess all the
nodes in the path, regardless of the number of landmarks used. The reason for
this is that, sometimes, a router in the path cannot satisfy any interest from the
landmarks because these interests can always be satised by other routers.
Figure 6(b) compares our strategy with random guessing. In this case, our
guess for C is almost always at most two hops away from C, compared to ve
hops for random guessing.
Figure 6(c) shows how often our algorithm identies the consumer. When
our strategy is able to identify at least one node one hop away from the con-
sumer node, it always identies the consumer node. This is the case with 200
and 350 landmarks, where our strategy identies C in the vast majority of our
simulations.
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Fig. 6. Routing aware adversary - Non-adaptive landmarks selection.
Routing-Aware-Adversary { Adaptive Landmarks Selection. Figure 7
shows the performance of our technique in this scenario. The ability to adaptively
select locations within the network allowsAdv to easily identify C in our topology.
Figures 7(b) and 7(c) show that, with 100 landmarks, our algorithm is able to
identify C with over 90% probability.
Non-Routing-Aware Adversary { Non-Adaptive Landmarks Selection.
Figure 8 shows performance of Listing 1.2 on AT&T with respect to false posi-
tives and false negatives. Our experiments were performed with threshold and k
set respectively to 1:5 and 2. Compared to routing aware adversary, the number
of false positives is higher. However, overall performance is still good: Figure 8(a)
shows that false positives are below 20%. Similarly to the routing-aware case, we
are not able to always guess the entire path P!C, as reported in Figure 8(b).
A similar behavior is shown in Figure 8(c).
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Fig. 7. Routing aware adversary - Adaptive landmarks selection.
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Fig. 8. Non-routing aware adversary - Non-adaptive landmarks selection.
Non-Routing-Aware Adversary { Adaptive Landmarks Selection. Per-
formance of this scenario are reported in Figure 9. Figure 9(a) shows that our
algorithm reduces the number of false positives in the AT&T topology. This
strategy is able to signicantly outperform random guessing strategy (gures
9(b) and 9(c)).
Table 1 summarizes the performance of all our strategies. We report perfor-
mance of random guessing obtained under the same conditions.
7 Detecting Eavesdroppers
Although C might be the only intended recipient of a set of content packets from
P , NDN allows any host to later retrieve these packets from routers' caches and
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Table 1. Performance of our strategies.
number of % of consumer guessed
landmarks our strategy random guessing
Non-routing aware
non-adaptive 350 99,3% 7,4%
adaptive 200 100% 0,5%
Routing aware
non-adaptive 350 93,0% 25,4%
adaptive 350 77,1% 19,3%
possibly do so without either P or C being able to directly detect this action.
This can be seen as an eective means of eavesdropping in NDN: in contrast
with \traditional" eavesdropping, this approach does not require privileged ac-
cess to the networking infrastructure and can be performed independent of the
geographic location of Adv with respect to P and C.
One way to detect this type of eavesdropping is by using techniques pre-
sented in this paper. For example, P and C could \rent" a set of geographically
distributed hosts while they are exchanging content packets. These rented hosts
would implement the algorithms discussed in the paper. Eavesdroppers will then
be consistently identied as extraneous consumers (other than C), and possibly
located. We envision that such a service could be easily oered by companies
such as Amazon, Microsoft, or other geographically distributed cloud providers.
8 Discussion of How to Mitigate Geo-location Attacks
One natural approach to prevent aforementioned attacks is to simply disable
router content caching. Besides negating one of the main benets on NDN, e-
cacy of this countermeasure is limited. In fact, an insider Adv that knows exact
timing of interest packets emitted by C can implement PIT-based techniques
outlined in [2]. Under normal conditions, Adv has a very small window (a few
ms to a few hundreds ms) to extract information from PIT-s on a single packet.
However, it is safe to assume that P and C exchange a large number of content
packets. This signicantly simplies the attack. Moreover, an insider Adv could
delay injecting content packets into the network upon receiving an interest. This
would force interests from C to be stored in all PITs along the path P!C for
longer, thus further simplifying the attack.
A better approach involves using unpredictable names [1]: P and C can ini-
tially agree on a secret seed (e.g., via authenticated Die-Hellman key exchange)
and use it to generate pseudo-random content names. Since the seed would be
known only to the two communicating parties, no outsider can guess content
names. Adv therefore cannot request content, which is necessary to locate C.
Unfortunately, this solution requires both P and C to be actively engaged in the
secret agreement procedure. This could generate a signicant (additional) load
on P , and will negating the benet of caching and interest collapsing. Further-
more, this approach is ineective against insider Adv who knows the seed.
Another approach is to \confuse" Adv by requesting content packets from
multiple geographic locations at the same time. Intuitively, since in this case
there are multiple consumers, geo-location algorithms would identify many of
them with roughly the same probability, oering a weak form of privacy (i.e.,
k-anonymity [27]) and deniability to C.
To the best of our knowledge, the only approach completely eective against
attacks discussed in this paper is the anonymizing network ANDaNA [6]. AN-
DaNA is an NDN equivalent of Tor [28]. It allows end host to join an anony-
mizing network as \onion routers", which anonymize consumers' requests. Un-
fortunately, the additional overhead and latency might be prohibitive for many
applications.
9 Conclusion
In-network content caching, a key feature of NDN, has been shown to have
unexpected privacy implications [1]. In this paper, we provided another example
of how abuse of network state can lead to loss of privacy in NDN. We designed
several techniques geared for adversaries with varying capabilities and evaluated
proposed techniques via simulations on a realistic network topology. We then
used the actual NDN testbed to validate our results.
Experiments show that plausible adversaries can locate consumers with high
probability, i.e., over 90% in many scenarios. Furthermore, even adversaries with
relatively little knowledge of the network can successfully locate consumers with
high probability, albeit, using more resources.
We then discussed several countermeasures, showing that even disabling
caches on all routers does not completely prevent this attack. Moreover, the
only eective countermeasure we are aware of (ANDaNA) imposes signicant
overhead on the communicating parties. Finally, we sketched out how the pro-
posed techniques can help identify eavesdroppers in NDN, which is a rather
unexpected outcome of router state.
We believe that the impact of our results goes beyond geo-location. NDN has
been widely assumed to provide better consumer privacy than the current IP-
based Internet due to lack of source/destination addresses. However, this paper
casts serious doubt on this belief. Further, we argue that our geo-location tech-
niques apply, to some extent, not only to NDN, but to any network architecture
that supports ubiquitous caching.
Acknowledgments
Alberto Compagno and Luigi Vincenzo Mancini have been partially supported by
the European Commission Directorate General Home Aairs, under the GAINS
project, HOME/2013/CIPS/AG/4000005057, and by the European Commission
H2020 SUNFISH project, N. 644666. Mauro Conti is supported by a Marie
Curie Fellowship funded by the European Commission under the agreement No.
PCIG11-GA-2012-321980. This work is also partially supported by the TENACE
PRIN Project 20103P34XC funded by the Italian MIUR, and by the Project
\Tackling Mobile Malware with Innovative Machine Learning Techniques" funded
by the University of Padua. Gene Tsudik's work was supported by United States
National Science Foundation (NSF) under award: CNS-1040802: FIA: Collabo-
rative Research: Named Data Networking (NDN).
References
1. Acs, G., Conti, M., Gasti, P., Ghali, C., Tsudik, G.: Cache privacy in named-data
networking. In: ICDCS. pp. 41{51. IEEE Computer Society (2013)
2. Ambrosin, M., Conti, M., Gasti, P., Tsudik, G.: Covert ephemeral communication
in named data networking. In: AsiaCCS. pp. 15{26. ACM (2014)
3. American Registry for Internet Numbers (ARIN), https://www.arin.net/
4. CCNx protocol. http://www.ccnx.org/releases/latest/doc/technical/
CCNxProtocol.html
5. ChoiceNet. https://code.renci.org/gf/project/choicenet/
6. DiBenedetto, S., Gasti, P., Tsudik, G., Uzun, E.: Andana: Anonymous named data
networking application. In: NDSS. IEEE Computer Society (2012)
7. Donnet, B., Friedman, T.: Internet topology discovery: a survey. Communications
Surveys Tutorials 9(4), 56{69 (2007)
8. Amazon Elastic Computing Cloud (EC2). http://aws.amazon.com/ec2
9. Eriksson, B., Barford, P., Sommers, J., Nowak, R.: A learning-based approach
for ip geolocation. In: Krishnamurthy, A., Plattner, B. (eds.) PAM. pp. 171{180.
Springer Berlin Heidelberg (2010)
10. Friedman, B.: A simple urn model. Communications on Pure and Applied Mathe-
matics 2(1), 59{70 (1949)
11. MaxMind GeoIP database, https://www.maxmind.com/
12. GeoTrace, http://www.nabber.org/projects/geotrace/
13. Gueye, B., Ziviani, A., Crovella, M., Fdida, S.: Constraint-based geolocation of
internet hosts. Transactions on Networking 14(6), 1219{1232 (2006)
14. Jacobson, V., Smetters, D.K., Briggs, N.H., Plass, M.F., Thornton, P.S.J.D., Bray-
nard, R.L.: Voccn: Voice-over content centric networks. In: ReArch. ACM (2009)
15. Jacobson, V., Smetters, D.K., Thornton, J.D., Plass, M.F., Briggs, N.H., Braynard,
R.L.: Networking named content. In: CoNEXT. pp. 1{12. ACM (2009)
16. Katz-Bassett, E., John, J.P., Krishnamurthy, A., Wetherall, D., Anderson, T.,
Chawathe, Y.: Towards IP Geolocation Using Delay and Topology Measurements.
In: SIGCOMM IMC. pp. 71{84. ACM (2006)
17. Liu, H., Zhang, Y., Zhou, Y., Zhang, D., Fu, X., Ramakrishnan, K.: Mining checkins
from location-sharing services for client-independent ip geolocation. In: INFOCOM.
pp. 619{627. IEEE (2014)
18. Lumezanu, C., Baden, R., Spring, N., Bhattacharjee, B.: Triangle inequality and
routing policy violations in the internet. In: PAM, pp. 45{54. Springer Berlin Hei-
delberg (2009)
19. MobilityFirst FIA Overview. http://mobilityfirst.winlab.rutgers.edu
20. Named data networking project (NDN), http://named-data.org
21. NDN testbed. http://named-data.net/ndn-testbed/
22. Nebula. http://nebula.cis.upenn.edu
23. Padmanabhan, V.N., Subramanian, L.: An investigation of geographic mapping
techniques for internet hosts. SIGCOMM Comput. Comm. Rev. 31(4), 173{185
(2001)
24. Periakaruppan, R., Nemeth, E.: Gtrace - a graphical traceroute tool. In: USENIX
LISA. pp. 69{78. ACM (1999)
25. Reseaux IP Europeens (RIPE), http://www.ripe.net/
26. Rocketfuel. http://research.cs.washington.edu/networking/rocketfuel/
27. Sweeney, L.: k-anonymity: A model for protecting privacy. International Journal
of Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based Systems 10(5), 557{570 (2002)
28. Tor Project: Anonymity Online. https://www.torproject.org
29. Verde, N.V., Ateniese, G., Gabrielli, E., Mancini, L.V., Spognardi, A.: No nat'd
user left behind: Fingerprinting users behind NAT from netow records alone. In:
ICDCS. pp. 218{227. IEEE Computer Society (2014)
30. Wang, Y., Burgener, D., Flores, M., Kuzmanovic, A., Huang, C.: Towards street-
level client-independent ip geolocation. In: USENIX NSDI. pp. 365{379. USENIX
Association (2011)
31. Wong, B., Stoyanov, I., Sirer, E.G.: Octant: A comprehensive framework for the
geolocalization of internet hosts. In: USENIX NSDI. pp. 313{326. USENIX Asso-
ciation (2007)
32. XIA - eXpressive Internet Architecture. http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~xia/
33. Zhu, Z., Burke, J., Zhang, L., Gasti, P., Lu, Y., Jacobson, V.: A new approach to
securing audio conference tools. In: AINTEC. pp. 120{123. ACM (2011)
Appendix A: Testbed Measurements
Figures 10(a) and 10(b) show that CFT can be used to accurately estimate
distance. In Figure 10(a), we connected P to University of California, Irvine
(UCI) and C to University of Arizona (UA), while in Figure 10(b) we connect
C to the University of Memphis node. Landmarks were connected to all nodes
in the testbed. In both cases, 8% of landmarks provided an incorrect distance,
likely due to violation of triangle inequality. Therefore, we added \random noise"
with probability 8% in the experiments presented in this paper.
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Fig. 10. CFT vs. distance for content published at UCI.
